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INTRODUCTION

South Carolina courts have recently begun to shift away from some
corporate protections from personal liability that Limited Liability Corporations
(LLCs) prov ide, leaving members of South Carolina LLCs facing a great deal of
uncertainty. The South Carolina Supreme Court's decision in 16 Jade Street,
LLC v. R. Design Construction Co.2 signaled this shift by denying LLC members
a "sweeping liability shield" that would protect tortfeasors from personal
liability. Deciding an issue of first impression in South Carolina, the court held
that a member of an LLC can be held personally liable for torts the member

1. See Andrew Cole, he New Amalgamation in South Carolina-A Shortcut to Corporate
Liability?, DEF. LINE, Suuner 2012, at 33, 36.
2.
398 S.C. 338, 728 S.E.2d 448 (2012). reh'g granted(May 7, 2012).
3.
Andrew M. Connor, PersonalLiabillityfor LLC Members: Defining the Limits ofLimited
Liability, DEF. LINE, Summer 2012, at 29, 29 (citing Jade St., 398 S.C. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454).
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commits, even while acting in furtherance of the company's business.4
Following this decision, the South Carolina Supreme Court decided a similar
case in which the plaintiff alleged that an LLC manager could be held personally
liable for tortious interference with contracts between his LLC and a real estate
developer.' In Dutch Fork Development Group II, LLC v. SEL Properties,LLC, 6
the court held that an LLC manager may be held liable for tortious interference
with a contract of the LLC,7 but found the facts of this particular case
insufficient to find the manager personally liable. This decision is a significant
expansion of a relatively undefined LLC jurisprudence in South Carolina. The
opinion affirms the supreme court's recent pronouncement in 16 Jade Street of
personal liability for an LLC member and applies it to an LLC manager's
tortious interference with a contract of the LLC. The court's legal analysis here
skips both some analytical and explanatory steps in ultimately concluding that
there was not sufficient evidence to find the LLC manager liable for tortious
interference with the LLC's contract.10 The result is a somewhat confusing
recitation of the law that applies to tortious interference cases involving
members or managers of an LLC. Additionally, a thorough analysis of the
tortious interference principles applied in Dutch Fork Development reveals that
the South Carolina Supreme Court both failed to give adequate consideration to a
manager's possible personal interest in interfering with the LLC's contract and
failed to provide a sufficient framework for determining what actions may leave
an LLC manager exposed to liability for tortious interference.II
This Note seeks to resolve the potential confusion resulting from Dutch Fork
Development by providing a more clear and comprehensive picture of the legal
framework that courts should apply in determining whether an LLC member or
manager is personally liable for tortious interference with an LLC's contract in
South Carolina. It will provide additional explanation of the legal concepts at
issue, examples of further case law, and a more coherent step-by-step analysis of
LLC member and manager liability for tortious interference with an LLC's
contract.

3

4.

Jade St., 398 S.C at 344, 349, 728 S.E.2d at 451, 454 (citing S.C. CODE ANN.

§ 33-44-

03(a) (2006)).

5.
See Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. II, LLC v. SEL Props., LLC, No. 27139, 2012 WL 3667374, at
*1 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2012).
6.
2012 WL 3667374.
7. Id. at *5.
8.
See id. at *6.
9.
See id. at *4 (citingJade St. 398 S.C. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454).
10. See id. at *4-6 (citations omitted).
11. See id. at *5-6.
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BACKGROUND

A.

South CarolinaLLC Statutes-Defining an LLC

The formation and regulation of LLCs are governed by the South Carolina
Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 1996 (the Act). 12 An LLC is a
"legal entity separate and distinct from its owners that is formed by filing
Articles of Organization with the Secretary of State and paying a ... filing
fee." 13 An LLC operates as "an unincorporated business association that
provides its owners (members) [with] limited liability [as well as] flexible
management and financial alternatives."l4 To illustrate, an LLC resembles a
general partnership whose partners do not "have personal liability for the
obligations of the partnership."1
An LLC may also be said to resemble a
corporation that is taxed as a partnership. 16 Thus, the two primary advantages to
the members of an LLC are (1) limited liability and (2) partnership taxation.'
These advantages have made LLCs a popular choice of business entity for South
Carolina business owners.
The management function of an LLC depends on whether the members
elect, in the LLC's articles of organization, for the LLC to be managermanaged.
An LLC will remain member-managed unless it is designated as
manager-managed.2 0 This choice of management type is critical because it
ultimately defines who is responsible for the management and conduct of the
LLC's business and determines "who are agents and have the apparent authority
to bind the [LLC]."2 In a member-managed LLC, each member has "equal
rights in the management and conduct of the . . . business," and a majority of the

members may decide almost any matter relating to the business of the LLC.
Furthermore, with limited exceptions, in a member-managed LLC, "[e]ach
member is an agent of the [LLC] for the purpose of its business, and an act of a

12. S.C. CODE ANN. § 33-44-101 to -1208 (2006).
13. Thomas A. Brumgardt, The ABCs of Entity Choice, S.C. LAW., Mar. 2006, at 14, 19: see
also S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 33-44-201 to -202 (2006) (outlining the entity characteristics and
organization of LLCs).
14. Burnet R. Maybank Il & Rick Handel, New Limited LiabilitV Company Act, S.C. LAW.,
July/Aug. 1996, at 60, 60.
15. Scott Y. Barnes et al., 1996 Limited Liability Company Act, S.C. LAW., Nov./Dec. 1996,
at 33, 33.
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Brumgardt, supra note 13, at 19.
19. See S.C. CODE ANN. 33-44-203(a)(6) (2006); see also Brumgardt,supra note 13, at 1921 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 3 3-44- 3 01(a)(1), (b) (Supp. 2004); id. § 33-44-404; id § 33-44-405(a))
(describing the management types).
20.
33-44-203(a)(6) cmt.
21. Id.
22. § 33-44-404(a); see also id § 33-44-404(c) (enumerating matters requiring the consent of
all members, rather than a majority).
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member ... for apparently carryin on in the ordinary course the company's
business ... binds the company."
Conversely, in a manager-managed LLC,
"member[s are] not agent[s] of the company for the purpose of its business
solely by reason of being a member." 24
If the LLC elects to be manager-managed, managers must be "designated,
appointed, elected, removed, or replaced by a vote, or consent of a majority of
the members." 25 Once elected, each manager has "equal rights in the
management and conduct of the company's business."26 Thus, any matter
relating to the business of the companv, except for a few enumerated actions
requiring the consent of all members. "may be exclusively decided b the
manager or ... by a majority of the managers" if there are more than one. In
accordance with a manager's role as business manager, he is an agent of the
company for the purpose of carrying out its business with limited exceptions.29
Consequently, an act of a manager for apparently carr ong on in the ordinary
course the company's business binds the company.
Furthermore, in a
manager-managed company only the managers generally have the agency
authority to bind the company- and "the acts of [a] member are not imputed to
the company unless the member is acting under actual or apparent authority
created by circumstances other than membership status."32 However, "the
agency designation relates only to agency and does not preclude members of a
manager-managed [LLC] from participating in the actual management of
company business."

23.
33-44-301(a)(1). However, this section provides ain exception to the member's binding
agency authority when "the member had no authority to act for the company in the particular matter
and the person with whom the member was dealing knew or had notice that the member lacked
authority." Id. It also provides that "[a]n act of a member which is not apparently for carrying on in
the ordinary course the company's business or business of the kind carried on by the company binds
the company only if the act was authorized by the other members." § 33 -44- 3 01(a)(2).
24. § 33-44-301(b)(1).
3
25.
§3-44-404(b)(3)(i).
26.
27.

§33-44-404(b)(1).
See § 33 -44-404(c) (enumerating matters requiring the consent of all members).

28. § 33-44-404(b)(2).
29. § 33-44-301(b)(1). Similar to the provision for member-managers, this section provides
an exception to a manager's binding agency authority when "the manager had no authority to act for
the company in the particular matter and the person with whom the manager was dealing knew or
had notice that the manager lacked authority." Id. The statute further provides that "[a]n act of a
manager which is not apparently for carrying on in the ordinary course the company's business or
business of the kind carried on by the company binds the company only if the act was authorized
[by the required consent of other members or managers.]" § 33-44-301(b)(2).
30.

§33-44-301(b)(1).

31. Id. § 33-44-203 cmt.
32. Id. § 33-44-302 cmt.
33. § 33-44-203 cmt.
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B. PersonalLiability ofLLC Members
The Act provides that "the debts, obligations, and liabilities of a limited
liability company, whether arising in contract, tort, or otherwise, are solely the
debts, obligations, and liabilities of the company." 34 It further provides that "[a]
member or manager is not personally liable for a debt, obligation, or liability of
the company solely by reason of being or acting as a member or manager."
Additionally, the LLC's failure to observe the usual company formalities or
requirements "is not a ground for imposing personal liability on the members or
managers. 3 However, the statutory liability protection for managers and
members may be waived, thus making them liable in their capacity as members
for either all or specified debts, obligations, or liabilities of the company.7 To
create such a waiver of the personal liability shield, the articles of organization
must contain a provision to that effect and the member to be held liable must
have consented in writing to be bound by the provision.
Until very recently, the South Carolina Supreme Court had never directly
addressed the issue of personal liability for an LLC member's own action and
how section 33-44-303(a) applies to allow or prohibit such liability.39 However,
in April 2012, the court decided 16 Jade Street, LLC v. R. Design Construction
Co. and held that a member of an LLC can be personally liable for torts
committed while acting in furtherance of the company's business.40 While the
court acknowledged that the language of section 33-44-303 appears to insulate
an LLC member from personal liability, it concluded that "such a sweeping
liability shield was not intended by the General Assembly."41 Accordingly, the
court held that "section 33-44-303(a) only protects non-tortfeasor members from
vicarious liability and does not insulate the tortfeasor himself from personal
liability for his actions." 42 Furthermore, the court's holding imposes personal
liability on individual LLC members or managers even for torts committed in
furtherance of the company's business. Accordingly, the Jade Street court held
a member of an LLC construction company personally liable for negligence that
resulted in numerous construction defects even though his actions were taken in
furtherance of the LLC's business.
In so holding, the court noted that a

34. Id. § 3 3-44-30 3 (a).
35. Id.
33-44-303(b).
36.
37. See § 3 3-44- 3 03(c).
38. Id.
39. Connor, supra note 3, at 29 (citing 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Const. Co., 398 S.C.
338, 349, 728 S.E.2d 448, 454 (2012), rehg granted (May 7, 2012)).
40. See Jade St., 398 S.C. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454.
41. Id. at 343, 728 S.E.2d at 450.
42. Id. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454.
43. See id. (holding tortfeasor personally liable for a tort committed in furtherance of the
company's business).
44. See id. at 349-50, 728 S.E.2d at 454.
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majority of states' courts that have examined similar statutory language have
likewise concluded that a member is always liable for his own torts and cannot
rely on his status as a member of an LLC as a shield. 45 Thus, it appears that the
Jade Street decision brings South Carolina "in line with the majority view" on
LLC members' liability for their own actions. 4
Even though the Jade Street declaration of personal liability for LLC
members and managers for their own actions is clear,47 uncertainty still exists
surrounding the decision and the legal positions the decision espouses. 48 This
uncertainty arises from the South Carolina Supreme Court's rehearing of Jade
Street on October 17, 2012,49 and the fact that the court has yet to issue a new
opinion. Moreover, following the initial supreme court decision, a joint
resolution was introduced in the South Carolina General Assembly to amend the
Act to expressly state that it is the "clear and unambiguous intent of the General
Assembly ... to shield a member of an LLC from personal liability for actions
taken [on behalf of the LLC]."o However, the joint resolution did not receive
three readings in both chambers before the legislative session adjourned.
Whether a similar joint resolution is introduced in the next session will
presumably depend on the outcome of the Jade Street rehearing.
Though this development is interesting, and the court may indeed revise its
opinion, the court will not necessarily reverse itself in a rehearing. 3 Instead, the
court could choose to "clarify its opinion."54 Until then, "Jade LLC remains the
law in South Carolina unless and until the Supreme Court reverses or modifies
its opinion or the legislature amends the LLC Act."55 While steps have been
taken to change the law through both of these processes, the rehearing and

45. See id. at 347, 728 S.E.2d at 453.
46. Connor, supra note 3, at 30.
47. See Jade St., 398 S.C. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454.
48. See Cole, supra note 1. at 36.
49. See Suprere Court-Roster of CasesfJr Hearing, S.C. JUD. DEP'T, http://www.judicial.
state. sc.us/supremeRosters/dspSupRosterChoice. cfm (select "October 2012") (last visited Apr. 6,
2013).
50. S.J. Res 1416, 119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2012), available at
http://www.scstatehouse.gov/sessI19_2011-2012/bills/1416.htn (introduced in the Senate on April
10, 2012, and referred to the Senate Judiciary Committee on April II, 2012); H.R.J. Res. 5150,
119th Gen. Assemb., 2d Reg. Sess. (S.C. 2012), available at http://www.sestatehouse.gov/
sessll9 2011-2012/bills/5150.htm (introduced in the House on April 19, 2012, where it received
three readings before being sent to the Senate on April 27, 2012, where it received only two
readings): see also Cole, supra note 1. at 36 (quoting SJ. Res. 1416) (describing the joint resolution
as a reason for uncertainty); Annual Meeting and CLE Seminar, Ass'N CORP. COUNS., http://www.
acc.com/chapters/sc/index.cfm?eventlD=12540 (last visited Apr. 6, 2013) (describing the joint
resolution's origination).
51. Annual leeting and CLE Seminar,supra note 50.
52. Id.
53. Business & Commercial Newsletter, GALLIVAN, WHITE & BOYD, P.A. (May 2012),
http://www.gwblawfirm.com/enewsletter-bc-may-2012.php.
54. Id.
55. Id.
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proposed joint resolution are not guarantees that any significant change will
actually occur. Even though there may be some concern from the defense bar
and LLC owners over the personal liability implications of the court's decision
for those operating LLCs in South Carolina,5 7 the court's decision is in
accordance with the majority of courts that have dealt with the issue in states
with similar statutes. 8
Furthermore, the South Carolina Supreme Court
promptly relied on Jade Street's pronouncement of personal liability for LLC
members acting in furtherance of the LLC's business in Dutch Fork
Development, affirming the court's willingness to apply the decision's holding
while establishing that an LLC manager could be held personally liable for
tortious interference with a contract
C. Tortious Interference with a Contract
The South Carolina Supreme Court has expressly stated that "[t]he elements
of a cause of action for tortious interference with contract are: (1) existence of a
valid contract; (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge thereof; (3) his intentional
procurement of its breach; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resulting
damages."0 An action for tortious interference protects "the parties to a contract
against unlawful interference by third parties" but provides no protection from
61
the wrongful actions of the parties to the contract.
The fourth element, absence of justification, warrants further discussion
because it represents the convergence of tortious interference's third-party

56. See id.
57. See generally id. (defense firm expresses concern over the implications and warns LLC
members to take precautions to protect themselves).
58. See 16 Jade St., LLC v. R. Design Constr. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 344, 728 S.E.2d 448, 451
(2012). reh'g granted (May 7, 2012): see, e.g., Hoang v. Arbess, 80 P.3d 863. 867 (Colo. App.
2003) (citing Snowden v. Taggart, 17 P.2d 305, 307 (Colo. 1932)) (finding that "an officer may be
held personally liable for his or her individual acts of negligence even though committed on behalf
of the corporation"); Ventres v. Goodspeed Airport, LLC, 881 A.2d 937, 963 (Conn. 2005) (finding
that a corporate officer could be held personally liable for tortious conduct); Milk v. Total Pay &
HR Solutions, Inc., 634 S.E.2d 208, 213 (Ga. Ct. App. 2006) (holding that an "LLC member may be
held individually liable if he or she personally participates or cooperates in a tort committed by the
LLC or directs it to be done"); Allen v. Dackman, 991 A.2d 1216, 1228-29 (Md. 2010) (finding
personal tort liability for members committing acts in the name of an LLC); Rothstein v. Equity
Ventures, LLC, 750 N.Y.S.2d 625, 627 (App. Div. 2002) (agreeing that members of LLCs "may be
held personally liable if they participate in the commission of a tort in furitherance of company
business"); D'Elia v. Rice Dev., Inc., 147 P.3d 515, 525 (Utah Ct. App. 2006) (applying personal
liability to members and managers of an LLC for tortious acts committed on behalf of the LLC).
59. See Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. II, LLC v. SEL Props., LLC, No. 27139, 2012 WL 3667374, at
*4, *5 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (citing Jade St., 398 S.C. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454).
60. Camp v. Springs Mortg. Corp., 310 S.C. 514. 517. 426 S.E.2d 304, 305 (1993) (citing
Todd v. S.C. Farm Bureau Mut. Ins. Co., 287 S.C. 190, 192-93, 336 S.E.2d 472, 473 (1985);
DeBerry v. McCain, 275 S.C. 569, 574, 274 S.E.2d 293, 296 (1981)).
61.

Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *4 (quoting Threlkeld v. Christoph, 280 S.C. 225,

227, 312 S.E.2d 14. 15 (Ct. App. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
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requirement and agency theory.
In the absence of sufficient South Carolina
authority, the South Carolina Supreme Court has relied on the United States
6^
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit to further explain this element. 6 The
Third Circuit expounded on this element, stating, "in order to make out a claim
of tortious interference with contractual relations, a plaintiff must show 'the
absence of privilege or justification on the part of the defendant." 64 Critically, a
"principal's agent [is] afforded a qualified privilege from liability for tortious
interference with the principal's contract. 6 5 "The agent's privilege is
qualified ... because it applies only when the agent is acting within the scope of
[his] authority." 6 Accordingly, "if the allegedly interfering acts were conducted
outside the scope of the agent's authority," then the "agent may be liable for
6'
tortious interference, just as if the agent were an outside third party."
The
Third Circuit's justification for this privilege illustrates the convergence of the
third party requirement and agency theory: "The reason for this privilege is that
holding an agent liable would be like holding the principal itself liable for the
tort of interfering with its own contract, instead of holding the principal liable for
breach of contract."6 8 The Third Circuit's approach to privilege for tortious
interference with a contract is relevant here because it is the approach that the
South Carolina Supreme Court ultimately adopted in Dutch Fork Development.69
D. Dutch Fork Development Group 11, LLC v. SEL Properties, LLC
In Dutch Fork Development, the court established that a manager of an LLC
can be held Personally liable for tortious interference with a contract as a result
of his acts.
However, upon the facts presented, the court held that this
particular manager was not liable because the plaintiffs failed to identify how he
exceeded his authority as the managing agent of the LLC.
The court further

62. See, e.g., CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 357 F.3d 375, 385
(3d Cir. 2004) ("The reason for this privilege is that holding an agent liable would be like holding
the principal itself liable for the tort of interfering with its own contract. instead of holding the
principal liable for breach of contract.").
63. See Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374. at *5 (quoting CGB OccupationalTherapy, Inc., 357
F.3d at 385 ("The actions of a principal's agent are afforded a qualified privilege from liability for
tortious interference with the principal's contract.")).
64. CGB OccupationalTherapy, 357 F.3d at 385 (quoting Crivelli v. Gen. Motors Corp., 215
F.3d 386, 394 (3d Cir. 2000)).
65. Id.
66. Id. (citing Labalokie v. Capital Area Intermediate Unit, 926 F. Supp. 503, 509 (M.D. Pa.
1996); Maier v. Maretti, 671 A.2d 701, 707 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995); Daniel Adams Assocs. v.
Rimbach Publ'g, Inc., 519 A.2d 997, 1000 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1987)).
67. Id. (citing Labalokie, 926 F. Supp. at 509).
68. Id.
69. See Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. II, LLC v. SEL Props., LLC, No. 27139, 2012 WL 3667374, at
*5 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (quoting CGB OccupationalTherapy, 357 F.3d at 385).
70. See id.
71. See id. at *6.
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found that there was insufficient evidence to establish a separate claim that the
manager was personally liable for tortious interference with a contract.
In Dutch Fork Development, the appellant Stephen Lipscomb was the
manager of SEL Properties, LLC (SEL) when SEL negotiated with Dutch Fork
Development Group, 11, LLC (DFDG) and Dutch Fork Realty, LLC (DFR)
(collectively Dutch Fork) to purchase a 122.28 acre piece of property known as
Rolling Creek Estates.7 ' SEL ultimately purchased the property from Dutch
Fork for $800,000 on August 8, 2000.4 The parties subsequently entered into
two contracts for the development of residential subdivisions on the property.75
The first contract, entered into on November 14, 2000, involved a three-phase
development of the Courtyards at Rolling Creek (Courtyards).'6 The second
contract, entered into on October 17, 2002, involved the development of a
smaller parcel known as Rolling Creek Phase 4 (Rolling Creek).
1.

Terms of the Breached Development Contract

In the first contract, which gave rise to the dispute, the parties agreed to
develop the Courtyards over the five-year term of the contract.78 SEL's
obligations tinder that contract were to secure financing for the purchase of the
property; to secure engineering studies, surveying, and landscaping; and to incur
the costs related to the infrastructure. 79 Additionally, SEL had "final approval of
all costs pertaining to the development of the property."80 DFDG was
responsible for the development of the property and was to receive a two-part
compensation from SEL in return for adequate performance of those
development duties. 1 The first component of DFDGs compensation was "a
development fee of $54,000 for each phase of the development, which was
contingent upon the sale of 60% of the lots developed in that phase and the
'letting' of the contract for the next phase." 8 2 The second component of DFDG's
compensation was "25% of the net profits received from the sale of the lots sold
in each of the three phases."3
DFR received the exclusive right to sell the lots in the development for a
five-year period provided that it sold and closed at least 20% of the lots available

72.
73.
74.
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id.
Id at *1.
Id.
Id.
Id
Id
See id.
Id.
Id (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id. at *2.
Id.
Id.
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per year in each of the three phases.8 The contract also gave DFR the exclusive
right to sell all new homes constructed in the Courtyards for a period of twelve
months after construction began on the home.s5 Additionally, DFR was entitled
to the following commissions: a sales commission not to exceed 7% for new
construction homes sold under the exclusivity agreement; a real estate
commission of 10% upon the sale and closing of developed lots to non-builders;
and no commission for any lots sold to builders. 8
2.

Termination of the Contract

According to Dutch Fork, SEL significantly delayed the sale of lots in the
development by SEL's failure to obtain a bonded plat, failure to promptly fund
necessary infrastructural repairs, and failure to promptly pay the project engineer
in order to obtain final approval of the redesigned development plans.8 SEL's
subsequent financial problems and additional work delays resulting from failure
to pay the engineering firm and contractors further delayed the sale of lots in the
development.
Furthermore, Dutch Fork discovered that lots in the
development were being sold below fair market value to a home construction
compaq that Lipscomb himself helped manage, K&L Contracting, LLC
(K&L).
Accordingly, DFR (a Dutch Fork entity) contended that such "sales
from SEL to K&L circumvented its 'exclusive right to sell' and prevented them
from receiving commissions on homes that were sold by K&L." 90
Lipscomb, on behalf of SEL, then sent a letter, dated May 28, 2004,
terminating the development contract, citing as the primary reason, "[t]he failure
of DFDG and DFR to sell at least twenty percent (20%) of the available lots in
any one year period."91 Dutch Fork asserted that the requisite number of lots had
been sold and filed an action against SEL and Lipscomb as a result of the
termination.92 After terminating the contract with Dutch Fork, SEL continued to
sell lots and eventually entered into a $7,633,000 contract with Essex Homes,
SE, Inc. for the development of two of the initial three phases in the
Courtyards. 93

84.
85.
86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Id.
Id.
Id
Id
See id.
Id.
Id
Id at *3 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
See id.
Id.
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ProceduralPosture

Dutch Fork alleged against SEL causes of action for breach of contract and
breach of contract accompanied by a fraudulent act. 94 Dutch Fork alleged
against Lipscomb, in his individual capacity, causes of action for conversion and
tortious interference with a contract.
With regard to the breach of contract
claim against SEL, Lipscomb conceded at trial that SEL owed Dutch Fork
money as a result of SEL's breach of the two contracts and claimed he sent the
termination letter because he mistakenly believed that Dutch Fork was required
to sell two lots per month. 96 However, he disagreed with the assertion that Dutch
Fork was entitled to $3,030,667 in damages for the unpaid profit split,
97
development fees, and real estate commissions. As for the claims against him,
Lipscomb maintained that his decisions and actions regarding the project were
made not for his personal benefit, but rather. on behalf of SEL. and thus he was
protected from personal liability under both the Act and the third party
requirement of a tortious interference with a contract claim.98
The trial judge directed verdicts in favor of Lipscomb for the conversion
claim and in favor of Dutch Fork for the breach of contract claim for the Phase I
development fees of $54,000.99 The jury then returned a verdict against SEL for
the breach of contract claim and the breach of contract accompanied by a
fraudulent act claim in the amounts of $299,144 in actual damages and $1
million in punitive damages, respectively 10o The jury also returned a verdict
against Lipscomb in his individual capacity for the tortious interference claim in
the amount of $3 million in actual damages and $1 million in punitive
damages.' 0' SEL and Lipscomb both appealed the jury's verdicts, but SEL
ultimately settled its claims by paying $1.5 million to the Dutch Fork entities.102
4.

South CarolinaSupreme Court's Decision

As a result of the settlement, SEL was no longer a party, but Dutch Fork
continued to pursue the claims against Lipscomb as the case ascended to the
South Carolina Supreme Court on appeal. 10' On appeal, Lipscomb asserted that:
"(1) he, as the manager of SEL, [could not] be held individually liable for the
claim of tortious interference with the contract; and (2) even if he [was] liable,

94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.

Id.
Id.
See id. at *3 & n.1.
Id. at *3 & n.2.
See id. at *4 (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 33 -44- 3 03(a) (2006)).
Id. at *3.
Id.
Id.
Id.
See id.
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the award of actual damages was improper." 104 Lipscomb essentially claimed,
and the court ultimately agreed, that Dutch Fork's only form of recovery was for
a breach of contract claim, which had already been satisfied through the
settlement agreement with SEL.105
In asserting that he, as the LLC's manager, could not be personally liable for
tortious interference with a contract involving his LLC, Lipscomb relied on
section 33-44-303(a) of the Act, claiming that it provided him with statutory
protection from personal liability.106 The court challenged this claim by citing to
its decision in Jade Street for the proposition that a manager of an LLC may be
held personally liable for torts of the LLC. 107 However, the court found Jade
Street was not dispositive of the issue in Dutch Fork Development because
Dutch Fork Development involved a separate question of whether Dutch Fork
"could sustain a claim of tortious interference with a contract."o108 In other
words, the Dutch Fork Development court reaffirmed that an LLC manager
could be held individually liable for torts, but then had to determine whether this
particular LLC manager could be held liable for the tort of tortious interference
with a contract. 109
To determine whether Dutch Fork could sustain a claim against Lipscomb
for tortious interference with a contract, the court first sought to "identify the
elements of the tort and the privileges afforded to a corporate agent." 110 Relying
on a previous formulation of the claim, the court identified the elements of a
cause of action for tortious interference with contract as "(1) existence of a valid
contract; (2) the wrongdoer's knowledge thereof; (3) his intentional procurement
of its breach; (4) the absence of justification; and (5) resulting damages."II
Furthermore, the court provided, "[A]n action for tortious interference
protects . . . parties to a contract [from] unlawful interference by third parties

[and, t]herefore, it does not protect a party to a contract from actions of the other
party."
The court then relied on corporate law to introduce the determinative
11^
issue for tortious interference liability in the case 1: "It is generally recognized
that when a contract is breached by a corporation as the result of the inducement
of an officer or agent of the corporation acting on behalf of the corporation and

104. Id. at *4.
105. Id.
106. See id. (citing S.C. CODE ANN. § 3 3-44- 3 03(a) (2006)).
107. See id. (citing 16 Jade St.. LLC v. R. Design Constr. Co., 398 S.C. 338, 349, 728 S.E.2d
448, 454 (2012), reh'g granted (May 7, 2012)).
108. Id.
109. See id. (citing Jade St.. 398 S.C. at 349, 728 S.E.2d at 454).
110. Id.
Il l. Id. (quoting Camp v. Springs Mortg. Corp., 310 S.C. 514, 517, 426 S.E.2d 304, 305
(1993)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
112. Id. (citation omitted) (quoting Threlkeld v. Christoph, 280 S.C. 225, 227, 312 S.E.2d 14.
15 (Ct. App. 1984)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
113. Presumably, the court relied on corporate law because there was not yet LLC case law in
South Carolina for the quoted proposition. The court thus treats corporate law and LLC law
interchangeably in this context.
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within the scope of his employment, the inducement is privileged and is not
actionable." 114 This privilege is a "qualified privilege" that protects a principal's
agent from liability for tortious interference with the contract of the principal.1
The court provided that "[t]he reason for th[e qualified] privilege is that holding
an agent liable would be like holding the principal itself liable for the tort of
interfering with its own contract, instead of holding the principal liable for
breach of contract."' 16
The court expounded on the critical notion that the agent's privilege from
tortious interference is qualified, clarifying that the agent's privilege is qualified
because it applies to protect the agent from liability "only when the agent is
acting within the scope of [his] authority."
Therefore, the court reasoned, the
privilege would not protect an agent from liability if the allegedly interfering acts
were "conducted outside the scope of the agent's authority"; the agent would be
treated as an "outside third party."' 8 Finally, the court concluded that, "as a
matter of law, a manager of a limited liability company can wrongfully interfere
with his company's contracts and be held individually liable for his acts." 11 9
Despite its conclusion that LLC members and managers could be held personally
liable, the court ultimately determined that Lipscomb was not liable for tortious
interference with a contract tinder the facts of the case.120
The court introduced its analysis by noting that the failure to include the
LLC's operating agreement in the court's record was a serious impediment to
establishing a tortious interference with a contract claim against an LLC
manager, because the operating agreement establishes the scope of the manager's
authority.
The court remarked that without SEL's operating agreement, the
court was unable to discern the scope of Lipscomb's authority, and "[w]ithout an

114. Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *5 (quoting Bradburn v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 273
S.C. 186, 188, 255 SE.2d 453, 455 (1979)).
115. Id. (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs.. Inc., 357 F.3d 375,
385 (3d Cir. 2004)) (internal quotation marks omitted); see also Thomas G. Fischer, Annotation,
Liability ofCorporate Director, Officer, or Employee for Tortious Inteterence with Corporation's
Contract with Another, 72 ALR.4TH 492. §§ 3-8 (1989 & Supp. 2012) (citations omitted)
(providing helpful background information by, according to the court, "analyzing state cases
involving the question of whether a director, officer, or employee could be held personally liable for
tortious interference with a corporate contract where the individual was considered a party to the
contract, acted to serve the corporate interests, or acted on behalf of personal interests" (quoting
Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *5)).
116. Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *5 (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, 357 F.3d at
385) (internal quotation marks omitted).
117. Id. (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, 357 F.3d at 385).
118. Id. (quoting CGB Occupational flherapy, 357 F.3d at 385) (citing Kia v. Imaging Scis.
Intl, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2010)); see also Kia, 735 F. Supp. 2d at 268 ("[A]
corporate officer can be liable for tortious interference only if he 'was acting in a personal capacity
or outside the scope of his authority."' (quoting Am. Trade Partners. L.P. v. A-1 Int'1 Importing
Enters., Ltd., 757 F. Supp. 545, 555 (E.D. Pa. 1991))).
119. Id.
120. See id. at *6.
121. See id. at *5.
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identifiable scope of authority, [the court was] left to speculate whether
[Lipscomb's] actions exceeded his authority as the managing agent of SEL."
The court found that "each of the actions relied upon by [Dutch Fork] to
support [its] claim can only be attributed to SEL and not to [Lipscomb]
personally." 1 To support this finding, the court pointed to the fact that, "[w]ith
respect to each of these actions, the documentation in the record establish[ed]
that SEL was the entity that sold the lots, signed off on change orders for the
development plans, terminated the contract, and entered into the contract with
Essex Homes."1 24 The court did acknowledge that Lipscomb was the primary
actor in each transaction, but concluded that "there [was] no evidence to refute
that he acted within his authority as the manager of SEL."
Further, the court
stated that even if Lipscomb received personal "financial benefit from the sale of
the lots to K&L." a com any he was a member of, "the sales were nevertheless
done on behalf of SEL."
In summary, the court concluded that because Lipscomb's actions could be
attributable only to SEL, there was insufficient evidence to establish a claim that
he was individually liable for tortious interference with a contract.127 In support
of this conclusion, the court pointed specifically to its inability to determine the
scope of Lipscomb's authority from the record and Dutch Fork's failure to
identify how Lipscomb exceeded his authority as the managing agent of SEL. 128
As a result, the court reversed the award of dama es for the tortious interference
with a contract cause of action against Lipscomb. 9
III. ANALYSIS OF TORTIOUS INTERFERENCE LIABILITY UNDER DuTCH FORK
DEVELOPMENT

A.

Identifying the Uncertainty Createdby Dutch Fork Development

The court's opinion in Dutch Fork Development, though seemingly
straightforward, fails to demonstrably explain or apply South Carolina law as it
relates to an LLC manager's tortious interference with a contract. These failures
create uncertainty for an attorney attempting to use the Dutch Fork Development
decision to counsel a client who is concerned about the potential liability of an
LLC manager for tortious interference with a contract. Specifically, though the
Dutch Fork Development decision clearly provided that "a manager of a limited

122. Id.
123. Id. Dutch Fork "primarily relied upon the sale of lots to K&L, the redesign of the
development plans for Phases II and III, the termination of the contract, and the sale of the project to
Essex HTomes." Id. at *6.
124. Id. at *6.
125. Id.

I26. Id.
I27. Id.
128. Id. at *7.
129. See id.
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liability company can wrongfully interfere with his company's contracts and be
held individually liable for his acts,"o it failed to develop a comprehensive
framework to determine when a manager may be liable or explain which facts it
found determinative in applying the relevant law to the case.1 31 The court did
generally establish that a manager can be held liable for his allegedly interferina
acts if they are conducted outside the scope of his authority with the LLC.13
However, the court then simply concluded that "each of the actions relied upon
by Respondents to support their claim can only be attributed to SEL and not
[Lipscomb] personally" 13 and that "there [was] no evidence to refute that
134
without
[Lipscomb] acted within his authority as the manager of SEL"
offering any significant guidance or factual analysis as to how or why it arrived
at these conclusions. As a result, an attorney and, more importantly, a client
whose decisions will ultimately be affected by the attorney's counsel, have no
guidance in determining what behavior constitutes "acting outside the scope of
authority" or "acting on behalf of the company." Because the distinction
between these types of activities appears to be the determinative issue for an
LLC manager's liability for tortious interference with a contract, the court's
decision consequently fails to provide sufficient clarity about when an LLC
manager may actually be held liable.
Admittedly, Dutch Fork made the court's task of providing a comprehensive
legal analysis more difficult by failing to include the operating agreement or
more detailed factual allegations in the court's record.' 5 However, despite the
limited record, the court made critical factual and legal conclusions that it must
have deemed as supported by some basis other than Dutch Fork's failure to
provide a thorough record. A more comprehensive discussion of the basis for
the court's conclusions in Dutch Fork Development and additional guidance as
to determinative facts for when an LLC manager or member can be held liable
for tortious interference with a contract of the LLC, even if only in dicta, would
have likely resolved much of the uncertainty resulting from the decision.
Nevertheless, although the South Carolina Supreme Court did not declare an
express personal-interest limitation for an LLC manager's claiming privilege
from tortious interference, such a personal-interest limitation seems to be
implicit in its reasoning and thus should guide lawyers and their LLC member or
manager clients.

130. Id. at *5.
131. See id. at *4-6 (citations omitted).
132. See id. at *5 (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc., 357
F.3d 375, 385 (3d Cir. 2004)) (citing Kia v. Imaging Scis. Int'l, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (E.D.
Pa. 2010)).
133. Id.
134. Id. at *6.
135. See id. at *5.
136. See id. at *6 (noting that Lipscomb benefitted financially from the transactions but that he
also acted "on behalf of SEL." which implicitly suggests that a manager acting purely out of
personal interest would not be shielded from a claim for tortious interference with a contract).
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B. Identifying and "Defining" the Key Concepts for Determining ffTien an
LLC Manager Is Afforded a Privilege from Tortious Interference
Liability
A key threshold matter in analyzing Dutch Fork Development and personal
liability of an LLC manager for tortious interference should be to distinguish
between a manager "acting within the scope of his authority." 1 a manager
"acting on behalf of'1 8' the LLC, and a manager acting with possible personal
interests.
Much of the confusion Dutch Fork Developments analysis caused
is likely a result of the court's blending of these concepts into a single analysis
without individually defining or distinguishing among them. The court may not
have intended to individualize these three concepts, but cases the court cited, as
well as persuasive authority from other jurisdictions, indicate that each may be
used as a separate and distinct consideration of a tortious interference claim.140
Because it is unclear how the court intended each concept to apply, persuasive
authority can supplement the court's opinion to identify the possible approaches
to tortious interference and what is the most likely interpretation of the court's
language with regard to a manager's "acting within the scope of authority,"
"acting on behalf of," and acting with possible personal interests in the
transaction.
Though Dutch Fork Development thoroughly discusses the significance of
only one of these concepts, "scope of authority,"141 the case is the controlling
authority in South Carolina, and accordingly this term provides the best starting
point for analysis. Dutch Fork Development defined "scope of authority" as
"[the range of reasonable power that an agent has been delegated or might
foreseeably be delegated in carrying out the principal's business." 14 The court
contrasts a manager who is acting within the scope of his authority with one
acting outside the scope of his authority.14 In applying this definition to the
facts of Dutch Fork Development, the court ultimately determined that the

137. Id. at *5 (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RIA Health Servs., Inc., 357 F.3d
375, 385 (3d Cir. 2004)).
138. Id. (quoting Bradburn v. Colonial Stores, Inc., 273 S.C. 186, 188. 255 S.E.2d 453, 455
(1979)).
139. See id. at *6.
140. See e.g., Bradburn, 273 S.C. at 188. 255 S.E.2d at 455 (citations omitted) (including
"acting on behalf of the corporation" as an element of whether an action is privileged). For a
discussion of how persuasive authority can be used to supplement the court's opinion, see infra Part
III.C. For a discussion of whether Dutch Fork could have implicitly contained a separate personalinterest consideration, see infia Part III.D.
141. See Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *5 (quoting CGB Occupational therapy, 357
F.3d at 385: BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 69, at 1465) (citing Kia v. Imaging Scis. Int'l,
Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 256. 268 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
142. Id. at *5 (alteration in original) (quoting BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY, Supra note 69, at
1465) (internal quotation marks omitted).
143. See id. (quoting CGB OccupationalTherapy, 357 F.3d at 385) (citing Kia, 735 F. Supp.
2d at 268).
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following actions were within the scope of the manager's authority: "the sale of
lots to K&L [an LLC in which Lipscomb was a member], the redesign of the
development plans for Phases 11 and III1 the termination of the contract[s
between SEL and Dutch Fork], and the sale of the project to Essex Homes."1 44
In rejecting Dutch Fork's argument that the manager was acting outside the
scope of his authority,145 the court stated that the record reflected that SEL as an
entity performed those actions and although the manager was the principal actor
in the transactions, there was no evidence to suggest that he acted outside the
scope of his authority. 146
The bulk of the court's analysis in Dutch Fork Development focused on a
manager acting within the scope of authority; however, the court did briefly
147
reference "acting on behalf of'
as well as, though implicitly, the LLC
manager's possible personal interest in the transaction.
The court first
introduced the concept of an agent "acting on behalf of' his principal in
conjunction with an agent "acting within the scope of authority," stating, "It is
generally recognized that when a contract is breached by a corporation as the
result of the inducement of an officer or agent of the corporation acting on behalf
of the corporation and within the scope of his employment, the inducement is
privileged and is not actionable."149 Although the court included no further legal
analysis regarding "acting on behalf of," the language quoted clearly identifies
"acting on behalf of' the corporation and "within the scope of his employment"
as two separate requirements.
The court also appeared briefly to address the manager's possible personal
interest in the transaction when it discussed the critical issue of this analysis: the
LLC manager's receipt of personal financial benefit from an allegedly interfering
act.150 However, in addressing the issue, the court simply stated that "[e]ven if
[Lipscomb], as a member of K&L, received [a] financial benefit from [SEL's]
sale of the lots to K&L, the sales were nevertheless done on behalf of SEL."
The court's inclusion of Lipscomb's possible financial benefit as an additional
consideration suggests that a manager's financial benefit from, and thus personal
interest in, the transaction is a consideration in determining whether a manager

144. See id at *6.
145. See id. Dutch Fork argued that these actions must have been performed outside the scope
of the manager's authority based on the following inferential steps: "[T]here was no legitimate
business justification for [the] actions," thus, the actions "did not serve the corporate interests of
SEL," thus, the "actions would not have been authorized by SEL" and, accordingly. the actions
must have been taken in Lipscomb's personal capacity. See id.
146. See id
147. Id at *5 (quoting Bradburn v. Colonial Stores, Inc.. 273 S.C. 186, 188, 255 S.E.2d 453,
455 (1979)) (internal quotation marks omitted).
148. See id. at *6.
149. Id at *5 (emphasis added) (quoting Bradburn, 273 S.C. at 188, 255 S.E.2d at 455)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
150. See id. at *6.
151. Id.
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can be held liable for tortious interference in South Carolina. Unfortunately, it is
unclear whether the court here considered the manager's possible personal
interest as a part of the scope-of-authority determination, or if personal interests
and "acting on behalf of the LLC" are somehow separate considerations for
tortious interference liability.
As a result of the court's passing treatment of "acting on behalf of' and the
manager's possible personal interest in the transaction, the significance of these
two concepts to tortious interference liability and their intended application
alongside scope-of-authority considerations is unclear.
However, as the
following section illustrates, other courts have defined and applied the concepts
more distinctly and such persuasive authority may be used in conjunction with
Dutch Fork Development to develop a clearer understanding of how "acting
within the scope of authority" relates to "acting on behalf of' the LLC and a
manager's possible personal interest, as well as what those terms mean in the
context of a manager's tortious interference with his LLC's contract.15
C.

Using Persuasive Authority to Understand Dutch Fork Development's
Use of Key Concepts

When the South Carolina Supreme Court originally established that an agent
acting on behalf of a corporation and acting within the scope of his authority is
privileged from tortious interference liability in Bradburn v. Colonial Stores,
Inc.,
the court relied on several state court opinions, including a North
Carolina court's slightly different statement of the privilege.15 4 The North
Carolina court. in W4ilson v. McClenny,1s stated that, for "[t]he acts of a
corporate officer in inducing his company to sever contractual relations with a
third party . . . '[i]ndividual liability may . . . be imposed where his acts involve

individual and separate torts distinguishable from acts solely on his employer's
behalf or where his acts are performed in his own interest and adverse to that of
his firm."'l56 This statement from WJilson serves as further evidence that, even
though the Bradburn court chose to employ different language for South

152. See discussion infra Part III.C.
153. See 273 S.C. at 188. 255 S.E.2d at 455 (citing Kiyose v. Trs. of Ind. Univ.. 333 N.E.2d
886. 891 (Ind. Ct. App 1975); May v. Santa Fe Trail Transp. Co., 370 P.2d 390, 395 (Kan. 1962);
Wilson v. McClenny, 136 S.E.2d 569, 578 (N.C. 1964); 44B AM. JUR. 2D, supra note 140, § 54;
Annotation, supra note 140).
154. See id. (citing Kiyose, 333 N.E.2d at 891: lay, 370 P.2d at 395; Wilson. 136 S.E.2d at
578; 44B Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 140, 54; Annotation, supra note 140); see also Wilson, 136
S.E.2d at 578 (expressing the slightly different statement).
155. 136 S.E.2d 569.
156. Id. at 578 (quoting A. S. Rampell, Inc. v. Hyster Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 102, 106 (Sup. Ct.
1955), affd as modified, 153 N.Y.S.2d 176 (App. Div. 1956), affd in part, rev'd in part, 144
N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1957)) (citing W. P. Iverson & Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 152 N.E.2d 615, 622
623 (111.App. Ct. 1958); Pennington Trap Rock Co. v. Pennington Quarry Co., 38 A.2d 869. 87071 (NJ. 1944)).
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Carolina courts,
the rule cited in Dutch Fork Development contemplates
considerations beyond simply whether the manager was acting within the scope
of his authority.
Thus, there is both South Carolina precedent and persuasive
case law South Carolina courts have cited that support reading the requirement
that an LLC manager "act on behalf of' the LLC as a separate requirement from
acting "within the scope" of his authority with the LLC.
In addition to South Carolina and North Carolina courts providing "acting on
behalf of' the LLC as a separate requirement from "acting within the scope of
authority" for privilege from tortious interference liability, there is support for
creating an altogether separate limitation on the personal interest an LLC
manager may have in a given transaction.
Other courts have also included a
consideration of personal interest in an allegedly tortious action in their
determination of whether a corporate officer can be held liable.16 0 For example,
the rule in New York is, "[A] corporate officer who is charged with inducing the
breach of a contract between the corporation and a third party is immune from
liability if it appears that he is acting in good faith as an officer ... [and did not
commit] independent torts or predatory acts directed at another."
To satisfy
this rule, a plaintiff may not merely allege specific wrongful acts on the part of
the officer, but he must sufficiently allege that the acts were taken outside the
scope of his authority or that he personally profited from his acts.162 The New
York Supreme Court, Appellate Division reaffirmed the inclusion of personal
interest in its requirement for tortious interference with a contract, holding that
the plaintiffs pleadings must contain an allegation that there was tortious

157. See Bradburn, 273 S.C. at 188, 255 S.E.2d at 455 (citing Kivose, 333 N.E.2d at 891;
May, 370 P.2d at 395 4ilson, 136 S.E.2d at 578: 44B Am. JUR. 2D, supra note 140, § 54;
Annotation, supra note 140).
158. See Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *5 (quoting Bradburn, 273 S.C. at 188, 255
S.E.2d at 455).
159. See, e.g., George A. Fuller Co. v. Chi. Coll. of Osteopathic Med., 719 F.2d 1326. 1333
(7th Cir. 1983) (stating that Illinois requires the alleged wrongdoer to have "induced the breach to
further [his] personal goals").
160. See, e.g., Courageous Syndicate, Inc. v. People-to-People Sports Comm., Inc., 529
N.Y.S.2d 520, 521 (App. Div. 1988) (quoting Citicorp Retail Servs., Inc. v. Wellington Mercantile
Servs., Inc., 455 N.Y.S.2d 98, 99-100 (App. Div. 1982); Murtha v. Yonkers Child Care Ass'n, Inc.,
383 N.E.2d 865, 866 (N.Y. 1978)) (stating that a corporate director performing an act where he
"personally profited" might make him personally liable for the act); Di Nardo v. L & W Indus. Park
of Buffalo, Inc., 425 N.Y.S.2d 704, 705 (App. Div. 1980) (citing Turntables, Inc. v. M. B. Plastics
Corp., 297 N.Y.S.2d 51, 53 (App. Div. 1969); Rothschild v. World-Wide Autos. Corp., 264
N.Y.S.2d 705, 707 (App. Div. 1965), aff'd, 224 N.E.2d 724 (N.Y. 1966)) ("Generally, when an
officer or director acts on behalf of his corporation, he may not be held liable for inducing his
corporation to violate its contractual obligations unless his activity involves separate tortious
conduct or results in personal profit.").
161. Citicotp, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 99 (alteration in original) (quoting Murtha, 383 N.E.2d at 866)
(internal quotation marks omitted).
162. Id. at 99-100.
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conduct on the part of appellant that was separate from his conduct as officer and
director or that he personally profited from the transaction.163
Furthermore, the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit,
applying Illinois state law, has likewise considered a corporate agent's personal
interest in the transaction when determining whether he was privileged from
tortious interference liability.164 The Illinois privilege from tortious interference,
similar to that afforded LLC managers in South Carolina, provides that because
"[c]orporate officers are not outsiders intermeddling ... in the business affairs of
the corporation[, t]hey are privileged to act on behalf of their corporations, using
their business judgment and discretion." 165 Thus, to state a cause of action
against corporate agents for interfering with their corporate principal's contract,
Illinois law requires "the allegation of facts which, if true, establish that the
officers induced the breach to Jiurther theirpersonal goals or to injure the other
party to the contract, and acted contrary to the best interest of the corporation."66
Therefore, substantial support exists from other jurisdictions for adopting a
separate and distinct consideration of an LLC manager's personal interest in the
transaction in order to create a more comprehensive framework to determine
whether an LLC manager can be liable for tortious interference with a contract.
D. Finding a Personal-InterestLimitation in Dutch Fork Development
Other courts' support for adopting a separate consideration of the manager's
personal interest in the transaction, in addition to the requirement that the
manager be acting within the scope of his authority, compels an analysis of
Dutch Fork Development to determine if it could have implicitly contained a
similar personal-interest consideration. It seems that there are two different
approaches available to arrive at a personal-interest limitation for an LLC
manager's privilege from tortious interference.
First, a limitation on the
manager's personal interest could be read implicitly into the "acting on behalf of
the company" language from Dutch Fork Development such that if a manager
had sufficient personal interest in a transaction it would preclude him from
having also been acting on behalf of his company. 167 The manager could thus be
held liable for tortious interference with the LLC's contract. Under this

163. See Courageous Syndicate, 529 N.Y.S.2d at 521 (citing Citicorp, 455 N.Y.S.2d at 99100).
164. See George A. Fuller Co.. 719 F.2d at 1333.
165. Id. (citing Loewenthal Sec. Co. v. White Paving Co., 184 N.E. 310, 316 (111.1932)).
166. Id. (emphasis added).
167. See, e.g., Wilson v. McClenny, 136 S.E.2d 569, 578 (N.C. 1964) (quoting A. S. Rampell,
Inc. v. Hyster Co., 148 N.Y.S.2d 102, 106 (Sup. Ct. 1955), affd as modified, 152 N.Y.S.2d 176
(App. Div. 1956). aff'd in part. rev'd in part, 144 N.E.2d 371 (N.Y. 1957)) (citing W. P. Iverson &
Co. v. Dunham Mfg. Co., 152 N.E.2d 615, 622-623 (Ill. App. Ct. 1958)); Pennington Trap Rock
Co. v. Pennington Quarry Co., 38 A.2d 869, 870-71 (N.J. 1944) (requiring that the corporate
agent's acts be performed solely on behalf of the company, precluding him from having a personal
interest in the transaction)).
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approach, "acting on behalf of' the LLC, with an implicit limitation on a
manager's personal interest, would constitute a requirement entirely separate
from "acting within the scope of authority." As an alternative approach, though
other courts have not expressly pronounced such an interpretation, a court could
use the phrase "acting on behalf of' coextensively with "acting within the scope
of authority." Under this approach, if the court wished to include a limitation of
the manager's personal interest in the transaction, it would have to be a separate
consideration from whether the manager was acting on behalf of the LLC. Thus,
a manager's personal interest in the transaction would be a separate means of
manager liability for tortious interference, available even when the manager's
actions were on behalf of the LLC or within the scope of his authority (using
those phrases synonymously).
Though it lacks the judicial support of treating the concepts separately, a
coextensive reading of the two concepts is a logical interpretation of the court's
language in Dutch Fork Development because, unlike courts from other
jurisdictions, the court failed to expressly include or adequately declare the
existence of a separate requirement for tortious interference that limits the LLC
manager's personal interest in the transaction. 68 The role of a manager's
personal financial interest and how the court applied the "acting on behalf of'
principle is certainly unclear as result of its cursory treatment of the issue;
however, an analysis of the court's language reveals that the court could have
intended it to be synonymous with "acting within the scope of authority." 169 For
instance, the court concluded that, even if the manager was receiving a financial
benefit from the transaction, "the sales were nevertheless done on behalf of SEL"
and the manager's actions can "only be attributable to SEL," but it pointed to no
facts to support this conclusion or why the manager's receipt of a financial
benefit was not sufficient for him to no longer be acting "on behalf of SEL." 0
In so stating, the court appears to be reasoning that the sales and other actions the
manager took were "on behalf of' the LLC simply because he was acting as an
agent of the company in the course of the company's business.17 1 Furthermore,
the court did not cite any additional supporting facts or provide any additional
relevant law that would suggest it considered "acting on behalf of' as a separate
consideration from "acting within the scope of authority." further suggesting that
it may have treated the concepts coextensively.
If the court did indeed treat
the two concepts coextensively, the lack of an additional express personalinterest limitation would suggest that the court imposed no such limitation on an
LLC manager's personal interest in a transaction that leads to the breached
contract. It would be ill-advised, however, for an attorney to adopt such a

168. See Dutch Fork Dev. Grp. 11,LLC v. SEL Props., LLC, No. 27139, 2012 WL 3667374, at
*4-6 (S.C. Aug. 22, 2012) (citations omitted).
169. See id. at *6.
170. See id.
171. See id.
172. See id. at *4-6 (citations omitted).
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reading of Dutch Fork Development because, in light of persuasive support for
reading "acting on behalf of' and "acting within the scope of authority" as two
separate considerations and the court's unclear application of these concepts,
there is too much uncertainty to confidently depart from that approach. 73
If, instead, the court intended for "acting on behalf of," with an implicit
personal-interest limitation, to be a separate standard from "acting within the
scope of authority," then the court's failure to provide facts supporting its
conclusion that the sales to K&L were on behalf of SEL establishes a precedent
that is essentially unworkable going forward. For example, there is no way to
determine what the legal standard "acting on behalf of' means in this context
because the court never effectively addresses it.
"Acting on behalf of' the
LLC is mentioned only in the court's initial introduction of the rule from
Bradburn and its conclusory sentences declaring the sales and other actions of
the manager to have been taken on behalf of the LLC.m Furthermore, even if
one attempted to apply the standard, in spite of the dearth of analysis, by
narrowly using just the facts of this case, it would not be possible because the
court fails to mention a single fact relevant to its conclusion that Lipscomb's
actions were taken on behalf of SEL. 6 The only fact mentioned in this
discussion, a possible financial benefit to the LLC manager, would actually be
more relevant to refuting the notion that Lipscomb was acting on behalf of
SEL.1 However, instead of explaining why it considered the sales executed on
behalf of the LLC despite Lipscomb's possible personal interest, the court
dismissed the manager's possible personal interest in the sales by concluding
that they were made on behalf of SEL.1
Such circular analysis has no
prospective value for attorneys and clients in regards to personal claims against
LLC managers for tortious interference with a contract.
IV.

CONCLUSION

This Note does not claim that the result reached in Dutch Fork Development
was erroneous or that the manager should have been held liable tinder the facts
of that case. Instead, it finds fault with the court's failure to provide a
demonstrable legal framework or explain how it applied the relevant law to the
facts of the case. The concern is that lawyers and their clients will struggle to

173. See supra Part III.B-C.
174. See Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *4-6 (citations omitted).
175. See id. at *5-6 (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, Inc. v. RHA Health Servs., Inc.,
357 F.3d 375, 385 (3d Cir. 2004); Bradburn v. Colonial Stores, Inc.. 273 S.C. 186, 188, 255 S.E.2d
453, 455 (1979); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 69, at 1465) (citing Kia v. Imaging Scis.
Int'l, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 2d 256, 268 (E.D. Pa. 2010)).
176. See id. at *5-7 (quoting CGB Occupational Therapy, 357 F.3d at 385; Bradburn, 273
S.C. at 188, 255 S.E.2d at 455; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 69, at 1465) (citing Kia,
735 F. Supp. 2d at 268).
177. See id. at *6.
178. See id.
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predict how Dutch Fork Development would apply in their particular
circumstances and be unable to make a legal determination as to whether an LLC
manager could be held liable for tortious interference with his LLC's contract.
Specifically, due to the uncertainty Dutch Fork Development created, there is
room in the opinion for a South Carolina court to construe "actions taken on
behalf of the company" as a separate requirement from "acting within the scope
of authority" and to apply a limitation on the personal interest the LLC manager
has in the transaction. Though this may not be the most straightforward reading
of the case, it has been adopted by other courts179 and is one that attorneys and
their clients need to be aware of under similar circumstances.
Adopting an LLC manager's personal interest in the transaction as a
consideration for determining whether he can be held liable for tortious
interference with a contract would alleviate concern that LLC managers are
currently enabled to self-servingly interfere with contracts without fear of
liability under Dutch Fork Development. The negative consequences of focusing
solely on the manager's scope of authority become evident in cases such as
Dutch Fork Development, where the LLC manager's scope of authority may
encompass any number of actions that would interfere with a contract of the
LLC.
For example, there are likely very few actions that the manager of a
small real estate development company could take in regard to a contract with
another real estate developer that would be outside the scope of his authority.
The manager will almost always be within his authority to sell the company's
lots to another company, redesign established plans for the company's
developments, terminate contracts with developers he thinks have failed to
satisfy those contracts, and subsequently sell the project to another developer.
Furthermore, such an all-encompassing authority for the LLC's manager will
likely be the case in a significant number of smaller LLCs in South Carolina, no
matter the industry.
Accordingly, with "scope of authority" as an LLC
manager's only limitation, that manager could also cause the company to breach
a contract with another company and self-servingly provide all of the contract
benefits to a company in which he has a financial stake, thus securing a huge
financial gain for himself, potentially to the detriment of the LLC and in
furtherance of his own personal interests, without threat of legal liability.
Though this extreme may not have occurred in Dutch Fork Development, the
legal framework established in the court's decision appears to allow for such a
situation to occur without the possibility of holding the LLC manager personally
liable for his self-serving inducement of the breach simply because he was
within the broad scope of his authority. 8

179.
180.
orders for
181.

See supra notes 159-66 and accompanying text.
See, e.g., Dutch Fork, 2012 WL 3667374, at *6 (manager sold lots, signed off on change
development plans, and terminated and entered into contracts).
See supra Part IIDA.
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To remedy this problem and ensure protection from liability for LLC
managers, attorneys should advise their clients if Dutch Fork Development
includes an implicit personal-interest limitation. Though the South Carolina
Supreme Court did not pronounce an express personal-interest limitation for an
LLC manager's privilege from tortious interference liability, unless and until the
court clarifies the significance of a manager's personal interest in a transaction
involving a breached contract of the LLC. it is something that must be
considered when providing counsel and making business decisions.
ChandlerAartin
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